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FOR RICHER, FOR POORER:
FEDERAL TAXATION AND MARRIAGE
By Michael A. Mess*
Four Canons of Taxation:
(I). The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the
support of the government, as nearly as possible, in propor-
tion to their respective abilities that is, in proportion to the
revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of
the state.
(II). The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought to be
certain, and not arbitrary.
(III). Every tax ought to be levied at the time, or in the manner, in
which it is most likely to be convenientfor the contributor to
pay it.
(IV). Every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out and to
keep out of thepockets of thepeople as little aspossible, over
and above what it brings into the public treasury of the state.
-Adam Smith (1776)'
No longer is the choice of marriage a simple, romantic decision. Under
the present Internal Revenue Code, a taxpayer's marital status results in a
variety of tax consequences. It is difficult to imagine that Congress con-
sciously and deliberately intended to establish marital status as an impor-
tant factor in federal income taxation. Nonetheless, through its
amendments to the tax code, Congress has used marital status as a primary
determinant of numerous tax questions. The quintessence of these
changes is contained in the Tax Reform Act of 1969.2 This Act created
four separate tax rate schedules, each of which imposes a different liability
based solely on the taxpayer's present or former marital status.
3
* B.A. Purdue University, 1973; J.D. George Washington University, 1976; LL.M. in
Taxation, George Washington University, 1978.
1. A. SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776).
2. Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (1969) (codified in scattered sections of I.R.C.).
3. The present four tax rate schedules are:
(1) Single taxpayers;
(2) Married filing joint returns;
(3) Married filing separate returns; and
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Although the tax rate schedules are not the only provisions in the tax
code which rely on marital status in determining tax liability, they are the
most visible example of the importance of marriage in federal income tax-
ation.4 Their creation was the culmination of three separate changes pre-
viously enacted by Congress5 each resulting from political pressure exerted
by various competing interest groups. Congress created the separate tax
rate schedules as a simple and expedient means of placating these groups.
6
Its solution, however, ignores the basic issues of who the proper tax unit
should include and what role marital status should have in income taxa-
tion.7 Through this piecemeal approach, Congress could temporarily pac-
ify the most vocal interest groups, but only at the expense of creating
greater problems for those less vocal. 8 Addressing the basic issues would
necessitate a complete re-examination of the federal tax code as well as
(4) Head of household (single individuals with at least one dependent).
I.R.C. § 1.
4. Another highly visible tax provision based on marital status is the zero bracket
amount, I.R.C. §§ 63(d), (e) (formerly known as the standard deduction). For married
taxpayers filing jointly the amount is $3,200, while for unmarried taxpayers (both single and
head of household) the amount is $2,200. For married individuals filing separately, the
amount is $1600. I.R.C. §§ 63(d), (e). Under the Internal Revenue Act of 1978, the zero
bracket has been increased for tax years beginning after December 31, 1978. For married
taxpayers filing jointly, the zero bracket amount will be $3400; for unmarried taxpayers,
$2300; and for married individuals filing separately, $1700. Internal Revenue Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 901(b) (Nov. 6, 1978).
5. For a discussion of the legislative history of these congressional changes, see Section
II infra.
6. Note, Federal Income Tax Discrimination Between Married and Single Taxpayers, 7
J.L. REF. 667, 678 (1974). See generally, Tax Treatment of Single Persons and Married Per-
sons Where Both Spouses are Working- Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972 Hearings).
7. The tax unit refers to the group on which an income tax is imposed. The several
alternatives are the individual unit, the marital unit (husband and wife), the family unit
(spouses plus minor children), and the household unit (all individuals sharing a common
abode). Thorson, An Analysis of the Sources of Continued Controversy over the Tax Treat-
ment of Family Income, 18 NAT'L TAX J. 113, 114 (1965).
8. The competing interest groups include single and dual income married taxpayers,
single taxpayers, and heads of household. The manner in which the head of household clas-
sification was created exemplifies Congress' stopgap approach to the discrimination issue.
The Revenue Act of 1948, Ch. 168, § 301, 62 Stat. 114 (now I.R.C. § 1), permitted married
couples to split their income thereby reducing their total tax burden. The head of house-
hold provision was enacted in 1951 to mitigate what was regarded as the harsh treatment
accorded to widows, widowers and other single persons with dependents under this Act.
The example of a widower with dependent children is particularly poignant:
Assume two executives, each with a wife and two children, have identical homes.
They receive the same incomes and, in general, spend their incomes in substan-
tially the same manner. Now, suppose the wife of one of the executives dies. In
the following year, he was required under the original income splitting amendment
to pay much higher taxes than his neighbor-even though he had to incur larger
expenses to run the household than when his wife was alive-because he was auto-
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tough political decisions concerning the role of taxation in American soci-
ety. Since Congress is not likely to face these basic issues in the near
future, the tax rate schedules will continue to be the focal point of any
legislative action aimed at alleviating or minimizing the claims of tax dis-
crimination based on marital status.
Congressional reluctance to undertake any thorough restructuring of the
tax system stems from the difficulty of balancing conflicting equities.
Married working couples criticize the present system because they pay
more tax than do single taxpayers with comparable income who use either
the single or head of household tax rate tables. Likewise, single persons
complain of excessive taxation because they pay more than married
couples with one spouse earning little or no income.9 Horizontal equity
matically denied the benefits of the double tax brackets used by married couples by
virtue of his status as a single person.
I HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 86TH CONG., IST SESS., TAx REVISION COMPEN-
DIUM, COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS ON BROADENING THE TAX BASE 481-82 (Comm. Print
1959) (material submitted by Joseph Peckman) [hereinafter cited as TAx REVISION COMPEN-
DIUM]. See notes 34-36 and accompanying text infra.
9. See Rothblum, Tax Equityfor Marrieds and Singles.-A Permanent Dilemma?, 4 TAX
NOTES 3 (1976).
The difficult task of devising a solution to the marital status issue within the parameters of
the present structure was explained by Edwin Cohen in testimony before the House Com-
mittee on Ways and Means:
Mr. Chairman, if you will forgive me for indulging briefly in a mathematical
analysis, I think this problem may be well illustrated if you consider four cases that
illustrate the nature of the problem and show the impossibility of a solution for all
of them.
Case 1 is a single person who earns $20,000.
Case 2, two single persons each earn $10,000.
Case 3, a husband earns $20,000 and a wife earns zero.
Case 4, a husband and wife each earn $10,000.
If we want no penalty on remaining single--and a large group insists upon
this-Case 1 must pay the same tax as Case 3. Single person earning $20,000 pays
the same as married couple earning $20,000.
If we want no penalty on marrying, Case 2 must pay the same tax as Case 4.
Two single persons earning $10,000 each pay the same tax as a married couple
each earning $10,000.
If we want husband and wife to pay the same tax however they contribute to the
family earnings, Case 3 pays the same tax as Case 4.
To summarize the tax results:
Case I equals Case 3.
Case 2 equals Case 4.
Case 3 equals Case 4.
Based on the fundamental mathematical principle that things equal to the same
thing must be equal to each other, the result should then be that Case 1 equals Case
2, or, in other words, that the tax on a single person earning $20,000 equals the tax
on two single persons each earning $10,000.
But that cannot be so if we are going to have a progressive income tax structure,
and progressive taxation is a basic tenet of our income tax system. The tax on a
1978)
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between married couples and single taxpayers with equal incomes ° and
vertical progressivity" are difficult to achieve simultaneously. The prob-
lem is compounded when a distinction is also sought between married
couples with one wage earner and those with two.
Although a solution to the problem may appear impossible, the purpose
of this article is to discuss proposals for placing less reliance on marital
status in federal income taxation. Each proposal will be analyzed in terms
of neutrality, horizontal equity and vertical progressivity. Thus, any pro-
posed solution will be viewed in terms of (a) the neutrality of its structure
with respect to marital status,' 2 (b) the equality of its treatment of taxpay-
ers, irrespective of marital status, and (c) the extent to which it correlates
tax liability with the taxpayer's ability to pay.' 3 A final solution to the
problem of discrimination in federal income taxation by reason of marital
status will be offered which will attempt to harmonize these three princi-
ples.
I. DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
Two specific complaints of tax discrimination have been asserted. Sin-
gle taxpayers complain that they are penalized by their choice of remain-
ing unmarried, while dual income married taxpayers complain that they
are penalized by their choice of remaining married. Although these
claims appear to be contradictory, the enactment of the four tax rate
schedules in 1969 makes each claim accurate.
The discrimination against single taxpayers has existed longer than the
discrimination against dual income married taxpayers. The joint return
provisions of the Revenue Act of 1948 created the single taxpayers' prob-
single person earning $20,000-Case 1-must be greater than the total tax on two
single persons each earning $10,000 if we are to have a progressive rate structure.
1972 Hearings, supra note 6, at 78-79 (statement of Edwin S. Cohen, Assistant Secretary of
the Treasury for Tax Policy).
10. Horizontal equity refers to taxing equally married couples and single individuals
with the same income as well as married couples with one and two incomes.
I1. Vertical progressivity means taxing higher incomes at higher rates. Our personal
income tax structure is based partially on this principle. For example, single individuals
with incomes of $12,000 pay 18.83% of that income as federal tax while single individuals
with incomes of $16,000 pay 20.38%. See I.R.C. § 1(c).
12. Neutrality is achieved when the income tax on two persons who marry is neither
more nor less than they paid on the same income before marriage. Bittker, Federal Income
Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1395 (1975).
13. There is a prevailing sentiment in favor of progressive taxation. A. MURAD, Eco-
NOMICS, PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS 222 (5th ed. 1970). Similarly, neutrality and horizon-
tal equity are goals espoused by many authors and taxpayers. See, e.g., Alvarez,
Discrimination on the Basis f Sex and Marital Status in Tax and Related Laws, 46 CONN.
B.J. 496 (1972); Blumberg, Sexism in the Code. A Comparative Study of Income Taxation of
Working Wives and Mothers, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 49 (1972); Sjostrand, Income Tax System
Needs a New Motor, Not Just an Overhaul, 54 TAXES 419 (1976).
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lem. 14  Later, when Congress sought to provide a degree of relief to the
single taxpayer,' 5 it created the dual income married taxpayers' problem.
The single taxpayers' discrimination claim will be illustrated first, in defer-
ence to their longer struggle against tax discrimination.
The basic argument of the single taxpayer is that the choice of marriage
is a personal right; one which should not be a major determinative of tax
liability.' 6  The addition of another dependent, after a taxpayer's mar-
riage, can justify an additional personal exemption, which provides some
tax relief. A reduction in the tax rate schedule based solely on the deci-
14. Pub. L. No. 471, § 301, 62 Stat. 114 (1948) (current version at I.R.C. § l(a)). The
joint return provision allows the married taxpayers to split their income equally between two
spouses. This is referred to as income splitting. The provision works as follows. The aggre-
gate income of the married couple is divided by two. The tax on one-half the aggregate
income is determined and then multiplied by two to determine the tax liability of the mar-
ried couple on their joint return. Since the tax rates are progressive, the tax on one-half the
income multiplied by two is less than the tax on the full amount. TAX REVISION COMPEN-
DIUM, supra note 8, at 475 (material submitted by Joseph Peckman). The different tax liabil-
ity of a taxpayer as a result of his or her marital status is shown in Table 1.
TAXABLE TABLE I
INCOME TAX LIABILITY
A B C D L M
3,200 0 145 242 140 0 0
7,200 620 900 1,042 850 418 620
11,200 1,380 1,840 2,078 1,710 1,152 1,380
19,200 3,260 4,170 5,002 3,850 2,892 3,260
31,200 7,100 8,940 10,938 8,220 6,072 7,100
55,200 18,060 22,050 24,822 20,340 14,700 18,060
103,200 45,180 53,790 56,610 49,780 39,660 45,180
This table assumes that each taxpayer has itemized deductions not exceeding the zero-brack-
et amount. In addition, in order to simplify the computation, the Table does not take into
account the fifty-percent maximum tax limit on "earned income" provided by I.R.C. § 1348.
The Revenue Act of 1978, however, has changed the zero bracket amounts, so that the actual
tax liability for the respective taxpayers in Table I will be changed as of 1979. See Pub. L.
No. 95-600 § 101(a) (Nov. 6, 1978).
The single taxpayers' complaint is reflected by comparing Taxpayer A with Taxpayer B,
while the dual income married taxpayers' complaint is reflected by comparing Taxpayer B
with Taxpayer C and Taxpayer E with Taxpayer F. As shown by the table, the complaints
of both taxpayers are valid with the dollar discrimination increasing as the income of the
taxpayer increases.
15. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (codified in scattered
sections of I.R.C.).
16. See 1972 Hearings, supra note 6, at 26 (statement of Patty Cavin); Note, Disparity in
Federal Income Tax Rates: Discrimination Against the Single Taxpayer, 4 IND. LEGAL F. 380
(1970-71); Rothblum, supra note 9, at 8.
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sion to marry, however, goes too far and provides an economically unjusti-
fied and unfair tax benefit. 17 The joint return provision is also contrary to
the philosophy of the Internal Revenue Code because it provides the tax-
payer with a clear tax benefit for a personal consumptive choice.
18
A common justification for the tax benefit provided to married taxpay-
ers is that marriage increases family responsibility and necessitates the
lower tax liability.' 9 The problem with this rationale, however, is that the
benefit is given to all married taxpayers, irrespective of any actual increase
in responsibilities, such as the existence of children. Rather, the mere per-
formance of a marriage ceremony provides the tax break.20
The problem is the result of the two distinct tax units created by the joint
return provision-the individual and the married couple. The Revenue
17. See TAx REVISION COMPENDIUM, supra note 6, at 479-80 (material submitted by
Joseph Peckman). Peckman suggests that if the world consisted only of single income mar-
ried couples and single persons who live alone, it would be inequitable to give any tax
advantage other than an exemption to the married couples. Id. His rationale is that it is
difficult to justify giving a tax rate reduction through the tax rate schedules to people who
prefer to spend part of their income on a spouse rather than to spend it in other ways. Id
Other individuals reach the same conclusion by arguing that the tax law should recognize
that there are economics in marriage. The cost of housing and food, for example, may be
lower for married couples than for single persons living separately. Moreover, the income
tax makes no allowance for the imputed value of a housewife's services. Accordingly, it is
argued, single income married couples have more ability to pay than two single persons with
the same total income. Id
18. Marriage is a personal consumptive choice in that the taxpayer has decided to con-
sume some of his or her income jointly to reap the rewards of marriage. The payment of
income taxes is an example of an expense that is not a personal consumptive choice while
purchasing tickets for a sports event is an expense of personal consumption. See Bittker,
supra note 12, at 1420-21.
19. See Oldman and Temple, Comparative Analysis of the Taxation of Married Persons,
12 STAN. L. REV. 585, 599 (1960).
20. The following examples illustrate the irrelevance of family responsibility to the tax
break:
EXAMPLE 1:
Taxpayers X and Y both earned $15,000 in 1977. Both were single until Tax-
payer X married Z on December 31, 1977. Z earned no income in 1977. By
filing a joint return for 1977, Taxpayer X pays $756 less in federal taxes than
does Taxpayer Y. Taxpayer X had no additional family responsibility in
1977, but saved tax dollars by merely marrying on the last day of the tax year,
the date on which the determination of marital status for federal tax purposes
is made. I.R.C. § 143.
EXAtMPLE 2:
Taxpayers X and Y both earned $15,000 in 1977. Taxpayer X was married for
the entire year. Taxpayer Y was married until December 31, 1977, when Tax-
payer Y's divorce from Z became final. Taxpayer X's spouse and Z earned no
income in 1977. Taxpayer Y pays $756 more in federal taxes than does Tax-
payer X. Taxpayer Y had the same family responsibility as Taxpayer X for
1977, but paid additional tax dollars by merely becoming divorced on the last
day of the year.
[Vol. 28:87
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Act of 1951 further aggravated the problem2' by creating a new classifica-
tion-head of household22-which may be used when an unmarried tax-
payer supports an additional person. The family responsibility rationale
23
is used to justify a tax reduction for the head of household, whose rate is
halfway between those of the single and the married taxpayers. 24 The
rationale apparently embodied in this compromise is that the head of
household has family responsibilities but does not have the expenses of an
additional spouse.25 The head of household, however, needs to prove
family responsibility to qualify for the lower tax rate schedule. In con-
trast, married taxpayers receive their tax benefit regardless of actual family
responsibility.
A second justification offered for the married couples' tax benefit is that
marriage creates additional living expenses. 26 Although marriage often
increases living expenses, the tax benefit is received irrespective of any ac-
tual additional expenses. Furthermore, any actual expenses incurred are
generally personal expenses which would not be deductible under the tax
code. 27 Moreover, the personal exemption and the zero bracket amount
are aimed at providing tax relief for such personal expenses.28 Under the
21. See text accompanying note 78.
22. See Revenue Act of 1951, ch. 452, § 301, 65 Stat. 480 (1951) (current version I.R.C.
§ 1). A taxpayer qualified as a head of household if he or she:
a. Is not married at the close of the taxable year,
b. Is not a surviving spouse, and
c. Maintains as his or her home a household which constitutes for the taxable
year the principal place of abode of a son, stepson, daughter or stepdaugh-
ter, a descendant of a son or daughter of the taxpayer, father or mother of
the taxpayer, or a dependent. I.R.C. § 2(b).
23. See notes 19 & 20 and accompanying text supra.
24. See, e.g., Table 1, supra note 14, at Col. D.
25. Jensen, The Historical Discrimination of the Federal Income Tax Rates, 54 TAXES
445, 449 (1976). Because heads of households did not participate in the same amount of
income-sharing as did married couples, the benefits of income-splitting were not awarded to
them. This compromise was adopted after the House version of the 1954 Code, giving
heads of households the full benefits of income splitting, was ostensibly rejected in response
to "a complaint that the provision did not treat all income groups equally and benefits pri-
marily the middle- and upper-income groups." S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 5,
reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4623, 4634.
26. Support for this argument relies upon the premise that single persons do not gener-
ally maintain a household or support dependents. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
MONOGRAPH No. 74-235E, MARITAL STATUS AS A FACTOR IN THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX
TREATMENT OF INDIVIDUALS 6-7 (1974).
27. No deduction is allowed for personal, living or family expenses. I.R.C. § 262.
28. I.R.C. § 262. Each married couple gets two personal exemptions of $750 each.
The Revenue Act of 1978 raises the personal exemption to $1000 for tax years beginning
after December 31, 1978. Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 102(a) (Nov. 6, 1978). I.R.C. § 151. In
addition, if the taxpayer chooses to itemize deductions, he is taxed on only those expenses
which exceed the zero bracket amount. The zero bracket amount is $3200 for either a mar-
1978]
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separate rate schedules, married taxpayers thus receive another tax reduc-
tion solely because of their personal choice to marry.
The additional expense justification also ignores the theory of imputed
income.29 Although the married taxpayer with a single income may have
additional expenses, he or she may also have additional services, primarily
household chores, performed because of the additional person in the tax
unit. These additional services can be performed without cost to the mar-
ried taxpayer, while the single taxpayer must either pay for the services or
reduce his or her free time in order to perform these tasks.
30
Thus, the additional expense argument looks only at one side of the
marriage issue. The tax benefit provided to married taxpayers effectively
grants a tax deduction for additional expenses without taxing the imputed
income generated by the spouse. Since imputed income is not included in
taxable income for either single or married taxpayers, the tax break given
to married taxpayers effectively subsidizes their personal living expenses,
with single taxpayers paying the cost by way of increased tax liability.
Regardless of any imputed income, the additional expense argument has
validity only at a subsistence income level. At this level, most income is
spent on necessary living expenses. Beyond the subsistence level, how-
ever, the expenses of a taxpayer are a consumptive choice based on per-
sonal preferences. Consequently, at higher income levels, the decision to
ried couple filing jointly or a surviving spouse, $2200 for a single individual who is not a
surviving spouse and $1600 for a married individual filing separately. I.R.C. § 63. The
Revenue Act of 1978, however, raises the zero bracket amount, effective 1979. See note 4
.supra.
29. Imputed income is defined as the economic value of an asset or service to a taxpayer
based on the taxpayer's ownership or receipt of the benefit from the asset or service. For
example, the potential rental income from a personal residence would be imputed income to
the owner. Imputed income is not taxed under the present tax code. See Bittker, supra note
12, at 1425-26. The following example demonstrates how imputed income of a married
taxpayer can offset the additional expenses incurred:
Taxpayers X and Y each earned $15,000 in 1977. Taxpayer X was married to Z,
who earned no income in 1977. Taxpayer Y was single.' In 1977, Taxpayer Y
paid $2,000 to Q to perform necessary household tasks. Z performed the same
household tasks for Taxpayer X. Taxpayer X had additional living expenses of
$1,500 in 1977 because of the two persons in the household. Taxpayer Y paid
$756 more in federal taxes. So Taxpayer X had $1,256 more spendable income
because of being married. Taxpayer X received $2,000 of imputed income from
Z's service, yet only had to spend an additional $1,500 to obtain those services. In
addition Taxpayer X receives the tax benefit of paying lower federal taxes by filing
a joint return.
30. Dual income married couples are also "treated unfairly" with respect to single in-
come married couples under income splitting. This occurs not "because a system based on
the combined income of married couples is unfair, but because the taxable income of the
single income couple is understated in that it does not include the value of services provided
by the spouse who stays at home." See G. BREAK & J. PECKMAN, FEDERAL TAX REFORM,
THE IMPOSSIBLE DREAM? 34-35 (Brookings Institution 1975).
[Vol. 28:87
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remain single should not penalize the taxpayer by increasing his or her tax
liability. Even accepting the common assumption that single member
households require less income than two member households, the argu-
ment that single taxpayers have a greater ability to pay3' loses its persua-
siveness once the subsistence needs of a taxpayer have been satisfied.
32
In summary, the single taxpayer's argument is that the horizontal equity
between taxpayers must be measured between individuals with the same
income, notwithstanding their marital status. The tax should be imposed
on the individual as the basic tax unit, since it is the individual's ability to
pay prior to his or her consumptive choices that is the proper measuring
rod. The marriage of a taxpayer is a personal preference and does not in
itself produce family responsibilities to justify lower tax. An additional
exemption is available to offset the additional expenses of choosing to take
on a spouse. Family responsibility justifies a reduction of tax liability for
both married and unmarried individuals who actually have dependents in
their care. Only when the issue of family responsibility is considered sep-
arately from the issue of marriage will neutrality with respect to marital
status be achievable.
The ranks of single taxpayers are growing;33 therefore, the issue of
justification for the additional tax burden will not quietly disappear. The
reduction of the single taxpayer's tax rate by the Tax Reform Act of 1969
illustrates the political pressure exerted by single taxpayers.34 The tax rate
reduction, however, did not eliminate discrimination against single taxpay-
ers and, in fact, created a new discrimination against dual income married
taxpayers. Because of the reduction, married taxpayers who are both em-
ployed are penalized for being married.
31. Cf BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF LABOR, REVISED
EQUIVALENCE SCALES FOR ESTIMATING EQUIVALENT INCOMES OR BUDGET COSTS BY FAM-
ILY TYPE 4 (1968) [hereinafter cited as BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS]. This report at-
tempts to compare "budget costs for specific standards of living for various types of
families." Id at iii. The report is currently undergoing a major revision.
32. As Professor Bittker stated:
[T]he fact that a single taxpayer could survive on $3,000 a year while a married
couple would need $4,000 for a similar survival kit is a flimsy need for concluding
that a single taxpayer with $75,000 of income can live as well, and hence has about
the same taxpaying capacity, as a married couple with a $100,000 of income.
Bittker, supra note 12, at 1424.
33. The number of unmarried individuals had declined steadily from 1920 to 1970.
See note 81 infra. Since 1965, however, the percentage of the population over 18 which is
married has begun to decrease. In 1976, 69.0% of the population was married compared to
73.2% in 1965. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES,
Table 48 (1977) (Marital Status of the Population, by Sex 1940 to 1976).
34. See e.g. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE , supra note 26, at 8; Jensen, supra
note 25, at 452; Richards, Discrimination Against Married Couples Under Present Income Tax
Laws, 49 TAXES 526, 534-36 (1971); Note, supra note 6, at 677 n.59.
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The basic argument of the dual income married taxpayers echoes the
argument of single taxpayers; the choice of marriage is a personal right
and should not be determinative of a taxpayer's tax liability. After the
Tax Reform Act of 1969, dual income married taxpayers filing separately
continue to be taxed at the prior law's single taxpayer's rate, while single
taxpayers are taxed at the new reduced rate.35 Therefore, the dual income
married taxpayer is forced to bear a comparatively higher tax burden than
the single taxpayer.
This discrimination can only be shown by a comparison with single tax-
payers. The joint return provision requires that the income of two spouses
be added to determine the tax liability.36 No distinction is made for the
allocation of the income earned between the two spouses since only the
total income is necessary to determine tax liability. Because the tax rates
are progressive, the aggregation of income of both spouses increases the
marginal tax rate to be paid on the total income of the married taxpay-
ers. 37 Thus when compared to two single taxpayers, the tax penalty for
dual income married taxpayers is the greatest when the incomes of two
spouses are equal.38 With equal income, the advantage of income split-
ting under the joint return provision is negated because the average in-
come of the two spouses equals their actual income and the marginal tax
35. Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1969, the difference between tax rates applied to the
incomes of single persons and married couples was as great as 42% at some income levels.
Under the rate schedule established by the Act, the difference is never greater than 20%.
The Act also provided a new head of household rate schedule halfway between the schedule
for joint returns and the new schedule for single persons. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV-
ICE, supra note 26, at 8.
36. See I.R.C. §§ l(a), 6013. The difference in tax liability imposed by this requirement
is shown in Table 1, note 14 supra.
37. Marginal tax rate is defined as the tax rate percentage a taxpayer pays on an addi-
tional unit of income. J. GWARTNEY, ECONOMICS, PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CHOICE at 483, 488
(1976). For example the tax on $15,000 for a single taxpayer is $2,630 plus 29% of $800. The
marginal tax rate is 29% since each additional dollar of income will be taxed at 29% until the
taxpayer's income reaches $16,200. I.R.C. § 1(c). The Revenue Act of 1978 has widened the
rate brackets for tax years beginning December 31, 1978. For example, the tax on $15,000
for a single taxpayer would be $2,605; until the taxpayer's income reaches $18,200. More-
over, the marginal tax rate is 30% for each additional dollar of income. Pub. L. No. 95-600,
§ 101(a) (Nov. 6, 1978).
38. Since the income is aggregated, divided by two and the same tax schedule applied to
each half, and because the schedule is progressive (the marginal tax rate increases with in-
come), the marginal tax rate applied to each half is lower than the average rate that would
be applied to each spouses' income. If the spouses had equal incomes, the marginal tax rate
applied to each income would be the same as that applied following income aggregation
which consequently would have no benefit. Since the benefit of income splitting offsets the
marriage penalty, the penalty is greatest when spouses have equal income. See TAX REvI-
SION COMPENDIUM, supra note 8, at 474-79 (material submitted by Joseph Peckman). Note
that income splitting is permitted only when a couple files a joint return.
[Vol. 28:87
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rate, as applied to the income of each spouse, is not reduced.39
On the other hand, the basic justification for the additional tax burden
on dual income married taxpayers is that all married taxpayer units,
whether single or dual income, which achieve the same level of income
should pay the same tax. While this justification does satisfy the principle
of equality between like tax units, it does not satisfy the principle of equal-
ity between two individuals who recognize the same income. A married
taxpayer unit which has the same income as a single taxpayer increases its
tax liability when part of its income is earned by each spouse. The inabil-
ity to choose the proper tax unit for federal taxation has created this incon-
sistency. On the same amount of income, the tax paid by the single
income married taxpayer is less than that paid by a single taxpayer, whose
tax is less than that paid by a dual income married taxpayer. The single
income married taxpayer unit, however, pays the same tax as the dual in-
come married taxpayer unit.40 By comparing the married couple tax unit
with the single taxpayer unit, the principle of tax equality is difficult to
achieve. Only by comparing equal income earning units and ignoring
marital status can the principle of tax equality be achieved.
The additional expense argument which has been used to justify the
joint return provision can more effectively be used to justify a tax break for
dual income married taxpayers as opposed to single income married tax-
payers. Dual income married taxpayers not only have the additional liv-
ing expenses of two persons, but also have the additional work expenses
incurred by maintaining two jobs in the same tax unit.41 Single taxpayers
who live together have the same additional expenses as the dual income
39. The following examples demonstrate the marriage penalty for dual income married
taxpayers:
EXAMPLE 1:
Taxpayers X and Y are married to each other and each earned $15,000 in 1977.
Taxpayer Z earned $30,000 in 1977. Taxpayer Z is married to Q, who earned
no income in 1977. Taxpayers X and Y file a joint return and Taxpayer Z files
a joint return. The tax liability for Taxpayers X and Y was equal to Taxpayer
Z. In fact, if Taxpayers X and Y filed "married filing separate tax returns,"
their tax liability would be $101 greater than Taxpayer Z.
EXAMPLE 2:
Taxpayers Q, X, Y and Z each earned $15,000 in 1977. Taxpayers X and Y
are married to each other. Taxpayers Q and Z live together. Taxpayers X
and Y file a joint return and pay $1,025 more federal tax than the combined tax
paid by Taxpayers Q and Z, who each file single returns. The decision to
remain married has caused Taxpayers X and Y a tax penalty of $1,025, al-
though they still pay the same tax all married couples with an income of
$30,000 pay.
See tax schedules, I.R.C. § 1. See also Table 1, note 14 supra.
40. See Rothblum, supra note 9, at 5.
41. Both spouses usually incur expenses for items such as transportation, lunches and
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married taxpayers. Although no express deduction is allowed for these
additional expenses, single taxpayers nonetheless pay a lower combined
federal tax than dual income married taxpayers simply because they re-
main unmarried.
42
The imputed income argument raised by single taxpayers, however,
does not apply to dual income taxpayers, since, in the latter case, neither
spouse is available to provide household services. 43 The additional serv-
ices performed for single income married taxpayers are without cost, while
dual income married taxpayers, like single taxpayers, must either pay for
the services or reduce their leisure time in order to perform such chores.
A final justification offered for the marriage penalty against the dual
income couple is to discourage one spouse from working so as not to take
away the job of a person who is the single breadwinner for another fam-
ily.44 This argument, however, ignores the fact that 46.3% of family units
have no children and thus have no additional household and family re-
sponsibilities to be managed by the second spouse.45 Moreover, this argu-
more formal clothing that cannot be deducted under the tax laws. See Alverez, supra note
13, at 496-500; Bittker, supra note 12, at 1431; Blumberg, supra note 13, at 59-66.
42. See TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM supra note 8, at 480-81 (material submitted by
Joseph Peckman).
43. The following examples illustrate the additional expenses and the lost imputed in-
come of dual income married taxpayers with respect to single income married taxpayers and
single taxpayers.
EXAMPLE 1:
Taxpayers X and Y are married to each other and each earned $15,000 in 1977.
Taxpayer Z earned $30,000 in 1977. Taxpayer Z is married to Q, who earned
no income in 1977. In 1977 Taxpayers X and Y paid $2,000 to J to perform
necessary household tasks. Q performed the same household tasks for Z.
Taxpayers X and Y had additional work expenses of $1,000 in 1977 because of
two jobs in the household. The tax liability for Taxpayers X and Y was equal
to Taxpayer Z. Taxpayer Z had $3,000 more disposable income because Q did
not work, as well as receiving $2,000 of imputed income from Q's services.
EXAMPLE 2:
Taxpayers Q, X, Y and Z each earned $15,000 in 1977. Taxpayers X and Y
are married to each other. Taxpayers Q and Z live together. Both Taxpayers
X and Y and Taxpayers Q and Z paid $2,000 to J in 1977 to perform necessary
household tasks. Both household units had additional work expenses of
$1,000 in 1977 because of the two jobs in the household. Taxpayers X and Y
filed a joint return and pay $1,025 more federal taxes than the combined tax
paid by Taxpayers Q and Z. Taxpayers X and Y paid a marriage penalty of
$1,025, and also incurred the same additional expenses as Taxpayers Q and Z
relating to a dual income household.
44. See Blumberg, supra note 13, at 92 n.172; TAx REVISION COMPENDIUM, supra note
8, at 491-92 (material submitted by Eugene J. Brenner).
45. The number of childless families has stayed fairly constant since 1950. It ranged
from a high of 48.3% in 1950 to a low of 43.0% in 1960. The percentage has been increasing
slightly every year since 1970, with the percentage of childless families in 1976 at 46.3%.
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, Table 60 (1977)
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ment fails to recognize that many individuals prefer careers to household
chores. Finally, many families need two incomes to keep pace with infla-
tion.46 Thus, although increasing the marginal tax rate results in a tax
disincentive to the second spouse's working, the disincentive has not
stopped the growth of dual income married families.
47
In summary, the dual income married taxpayers' argument is the same
as the single taxpayers' argument: the tax should be imposed on the indi-
vidual as the basic tax unit. In order to achieve neutrality with respect to
marriage, family responsibility should be separated from the issue of mari-
tal status.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
The legislative history of the four present tax rate schedules is a vivid
example of legislative indecision. The historical development clearly indi-
cates that the role of marriage and the choice of the proper tax unit have
not been carefully considered in federal income taxation. Since 1913 the
effect of marital status on taxation has evolved through three distinct
stages, 48 each stage implemented to cure a past problem without consider-
ation of the additional problems it created. Although originally based on
the individual, the tax unit was eventually changed to use the married tax-
(Percent Distribution of Families, by Number of Own Children Under 18 Years Old: 1950
to 1976).
46. The number of married couples in which both spouses work has been steadily in-
creasing. In 1950, only 23.8% of married women with the husband present were employed
in the labor force. By 1976, 45.0% of married women were working. Id, Table 634 (Mar-
ried Women (Husband Present) in the Labor Force, by Age and Presence of Children: 1950
to 1976). Since the husband is the traditional wage earner of the family, the number of
working wives shows the increase in dual income married couples.
47. Discrimination has encouraged couples to attempt to avoid the marriage penalty by
engaging in tax-motivated divorces and remarriages. Since tax status is determined on the
last day of the tax year, couples obtain a divorce at the end of December so as to be unmar-
ried for the tax year. I.R.C. § 143(a)(1). The couples then remarry early in January as they
intended. The cost of a trip to a receptive Caribbean jurisdiction in order to obtain the
divorce is far less than the tax savings involved. See Feld, Divorce, Tax-Syle, 54 TAXES
608, 609 (1976).
In response, the Internal Revenue Service issued Rev. Rul. 76-255, 1976-2 C.B. 40, which
states that the tax law does not contemplate a sham transaction that manipulates year-end
marital status for federal income tax purposes. Under the ruling, such couples are consid-
ered married for tax purposes.
48. See notes 50, 71 and 82 and accompanying text infra. In the first stage, the tax unit
was the individual. The Revenue Act of 1948 implemented discretionary joint returns and
made married taxpayers the basic tax unit. With enactment of separate rate schedules,
marital status became important for the first time. The Tax Reform Act of 1969 left mar-
ried taxpayers as the basic unit, while reducing the single taxpayers' rate schedule. The
1969 Act effectively made joint returns mandatory. Thus, for the first time, marriage could
mean a substantial tax penalty.
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payer as the basic unit. At no time, however, was the principle of horizon-
tal equity properly considered. 4
9
When the initial income tax law was enacted in 1913, only one tax rate
schedule was adopted.50 The individual was the basic tax unit for federal
taxation, and the individual's marital status did not affect his tax liability.
The married taxpayer was allowed an additional personal exemption, but
was taxed at the same rate as the single taxpayer.5' Every individual,
whether married or single, who received income from any source was re-
sponsible for filing his or her tax return. It was not until 1918 that a joint
return for married couples was recognized by statute.52 Rather than pro-
viding a tax benefit, the joint return increased a married couple's tax liabil-
ity if both recognized income during the tax year.53 The 1918 joint return
provision required the married taxpayers to aggregate their individual in-
comes and pay tax on the total.54 With a single progressive rate for all
taxpayers, the joint return usually produced a higher tax liability for dual
income married taxpayers.
The legislative history behind the enactment of the original Revenue
Act of 1913 is devoid of any discussion as to why the individual taxpayer,
irrespective of marital status, was chosen as the proper tax unit. There are
numerous plausible reasons for the choice, including the existence of a
large number of single individuals, 55 the trend toward recognition of sepa-
rate property rights for women,56 and a tacit assumption that the term "in-
dividual taxpayer" referred only to the male gender. In all probability, it
is likely that the issue of marital status was not considered and that the
language of the Act merely reflected the contemporary drafting style. 57
49. See Note, supra note 6, at 676.
50. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(A)(1), (2), 38 Stat. 166 (1913) (now I.R.C. § 1).
51. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 223, 40 Stat. 1074 (1919) (current version at I.R.C. §
1).
52. See Bittker, supra note 12, at 1400.
53. Joint filings were advantageous only in unusual circumstances. For example, a
joint return could increase a couple's deductions for charitable contributions by increasing
their adjusted gross income and hence raising the deduction ceiling which is determined by a
percentage of adjusted gross income. Id. at 1400 n.20.
54. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 223, 40 Stat. 1074 (1919) (current version at I.R.C.§
1).
55. In 1920 single individuals over the age of 14 were 41% of the population. Single
individuals include those widowed and divorced. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, Table 46 (1975) (Marital Status of the Population, by Sex
1920 to 1974).
56. See Thorson, supra note 7, at 115.
57. The Revenue Act of 1913 imposed a tax on every individual: "upon the entire net
income arising or accruing from all sources . . . to every citizen of the United States ...
and to every person residing in the United States though not a citizen thereof. . . ." Reve-
nue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(A)(l), 38 Stat. 166 (1913) (current version at I.R.C. §§ 1, 61).
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The single tax rate schedule provided fertile ground for artificial income
shifting schemes58 because the progressive tax structure made it advanta-
geous to allocate income to other taxpayers. Splitting the income among
several taxpayers, usually within the same family, lowered the marginal
tax rate on each segment of the income and, when averaged, was less than
the marginal rate on the income attributed to only one taxpayer.
In the early years of its development, the income tax was primarily a tax
on the wealthy, and artificial income shifting schemes were tolerated. The
loss of revenue by such schemes was not sufficient to create resentment
among other taxpayers since most individuals did not pay federal income
taxes.59 During this period, all controls on income shifting were left to the
courts and to the requirements of state property laws. The United States
Supreme Court decided two cases in 1930 which set important parameters
on the income shifting devices which could legitimately reduce an individ-
ual's tax liability. The initial case was Lucas v. Earl60 in which the Court
distinguished between earned income and investment income. The Court
held the husband fully taxable on his earned income, even though he and
his wife had legally contracted to split their income well before the enact-
ment of the income tax law.
6'
After Lucas it became virtually impossible for a taxpayer to shift his or
her earned income to another taxpayer to lower tax liability. Nonetheless,
unearned income such as dividends, rents, interest, and royalties could be
shifted easily in order to lower tax liability. Ownership of the underlying
property was considered to be the source of the income. As long as legal
ownership was effectively shifted to another taxpayer under state law, no
inquiry into the relationship between parties was made.
62
The language used is similar to that found in the Constitution and several amendments to
the Constitution, in particular the fourteenth amendment. The language reflects an attempt
to encompass all possible situations through a broad and general drafting style.
58. Income is shifted when a taxpayer in a higher tax bracket transfers it to one in a
lower tax bracket. Such shifts occur generally where there is a close relationship between
the taxpayers. Various artificial means of shifting income, including gifts, trusts and family
partnerships, are used.
59. See Note, supra note 16 at 383. The Revenue Act of 1928 taxed the net income
("net income" is analogous terminology to present-day "taxable income") of every individ-
ual at a rate equal to the sum of the following: (a) 1 1/2% of the first $4,000 of the amount of
net income in excess of the credits allowed, (b) 3% of the next $4,000 of such excess amount,
and (c) 5% of the remainder of such excess amount. Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 11, 45
Stat. 791 (1928) (current version at I.R.C. § 1). The current rates for single individuals
progress from 14% of the excess over $2,200 to 70% of the excess over $102,200. See I.R.C.
§ 1(c). But see changes in the Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600 (Nov. 6, 1978)
effective as of January 1, 1979.
60. 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
61. Id. at 113-15.
62. See Bittker, supra note 12, at 1401.
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The general principle of taxing income to the one who earned it, or to
the taxpayer who owned its source, was modified by Poe v. Seaborn.63 In
Poe, the Supreme Court distinguished community property states from
common law states with respect to income splitting. The Court held that
under the federal tax laws, federal taxation was dependent on state prop-
erty laws to determine the ownership of property.64 Nevertheless, it found
that under community property laws, each spouse had a vested right to
one-half of the income of the other spouse, whether the income was earned
or unearned. 65 The Court distinguished Lucas by noting that the vested
right in community property states arose by operation of law rather than
by affirmative action on the taxpayers' part.66 Married taxpayers in the
eight community property states67 could thus split all their income, includ-
ing earned personal income.
Since income taxation was still not universal, the full impact of Lucas
and Poe did not immediately reach most individuals. The low federal
income tax rates, however, could not generate enough income to offset the
expenditures required by the depression of the 1930's and World War II.
Therefore, tax rates increased sharply. 68 Due to Poe, these increases cre-
ated conspicious advantages for married taxpayers in community property
states. As a result, many common law states began adopting community
property laws for federal tax purposes. By 1948 five states had adopted a
form of community property laws and several others were seriously con-
sidering the issue.6
9
63. 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
64. Id at 110.
65. Id at I11.
66. Id at 117.
67. Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas and Washing-
ton. See Note, supra note 6, at 671-72 n.23.
Poe made it clear that state property law would override the principle of taxing income to
the actual earner, in the absence of a federal definition of ownership. This allowed a geo-
graphic anomaly in the growth of the United States to play an important role in federal
taxation. The eight states which had community property laws had a Spanish legal heritage
as compared to the common law states which generally had an English legal heritage. Id at
671-72. Although the United States had been independent over 150 years, a heritage devel-
oped well before independence became important in deciding a federal tax policy.
68. See Revenue Act of 1948, § 301, 62 Stat. 114 (1948) (now I.R.C. § 1). See Note,
supra note 16, at 383-84.
For example, a married taxpayer with two dependents and an adjusted gross income of
$15,000 would have paid $831 in tax in 1939. By 1943, his tax bill would have been $4,625.
Hearings on H. 4790 Before the Senate Finance Comm., 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1948)
(testimony of John Hanes).
69. Oklahoma and Oregon authorized their married citizens to elect to be governed by
community property laws. The Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44
(1944), however, held that these laws were substantially the same as the income splitting
contract held to be ineffective for federal tax purposes in Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
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Due to the difficult problems that would be faced by a state converting
to community property law, 70 it was apparent that federal legislation
would be a simpler solution. The end of the war brought pressure to re-
duce taxes; therefore to achieve that purpose, as well as to eliminate the tax
advantages of the community property law states, the joint return provi-
sion was adopted in 1948. 71 Adopting a second tax rate schedule solely
for use by married taxpayers, 72 the joint return provision was discretionary
and legitimized income splitting between spouses by effectively adopting a
nationwide community property system for federal taxation purposes.
The second tax rate schedule taxed married taxpayers as if each spouse
earned one-half of the aggregate income of the couple. With the progres-
sive tax structure, this produced a substantial tax savings for married tax-
payers.
Although the decision to enact the joint return provision stemmed from
congressional desire to end the tax advantage enjoyed by married taxpay-
ers in community property law states, 73 it unintentionally forced a major
shift in the basic tax unit for federal taxation. Upon enactment, married
Oklahoma and Oregon promptly replaced their optional systems with mandatory commu-
nity property systems. See Bittker, supra note 12, at 1411-12.
Hawaii, Nebraska, Michigan and Pennsylvania passed community property laws, and by
1948, Massachusetts and New York were considering similar steps. See Note, Epilogue to
the Community Property Scramble.- Problems of Repeal, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 332, 332 n.4
(1950) and statutes cited therein.
70. See Bittker, supra note 12, at 1412 n.65; Note, supra note 16, at 384. In addition, it
is doubtful whether the Internal Revenue Service would have been able to cope with the
administrative problem of passing on the thousands of close cases. See TAX REVISION
COMPENDIUM, supra note 8, at 473.
71. Revenue Act of 1948, § 301, 62 Stat. 114 (1948) (now I.R.C. § 1). See CONGRES-
SIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 26, at 5-6; Bittker, supra note 12, at 1413. Although
the major justification for the introduction of income splitting was to equalize tax treatment
for residents of all states, many argued that married couples generally have greater living
expenses.than do single persons and that married couples therefore should have a reduced
tax liability. See notes 26-32 and accompanying text supra.
72. See Internal Revenue Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 12(d), 53 Stat. 47 (1939) (now I.R.C. §
301). See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 26, at 6; Bittker, supra note 12,
at 1412-13.
73. Since the provision lowered taxes for married taxpayers in common law states and
did not raise taxes for married taxpayers in community property states, it was favored by
most married taxpayers. Other factors influencing the passage of the Revenue Act of 1948
included approval by the Treasury Department and recognition by politically astute legisla-
tors that splitting income would assure the votes necessary for victory in the running tax
battle with the President. U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, THE TAX TREATMENT OF FAMILY
INCOME (1947), reprinted in Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means on Reve-
nue Revisions, 1947-48, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 846-74 (1947). The adoption of the split in-
come plan was stressed repeatedly in congressional debate as justifying enactment of tax-
reduction legislation. See Surrey, Federal Taxation of the Family-The Revenue Act of
1948, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1097, 1104-05, 1105 nn.31 & 32 (1948).
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taxpayers became the basic tax unit.74 For the first time, the role of mari-
tal status was important in federal taxation because income splitting re-
duced taxes and, accordingly, made it advantageous to be married. The
consequences of this change in the role of marriage for taxation purposes
were not considered. 75 The resultant shift of the tax burden to single tax-
payers was accomplished without a discussion of what the relationship of
single taxpayers to married taxpayers should be. Legislative history is de-
void of discussion of the higher tax burden placed on single taxpayers or
the claim that family responsibility and additional expenses justifies the
difference in the burden.76 It was not until complaints of tax discrimina-
tion surfaced that the tax benefit afforded married taxpayers was justified
as an allowance for family responsibility and the additional expenses of
married taxpayers.
77
The use of the family responsibility justification led to the enactment of
a third tax rate schedule in 1951. 78 The head of household tax rate sched-
ule provided single taxpayers who had family responsibilities, such as a
dependent child or parents, with one-half the benefits provided married
taxpayers under the joint return provision. 79 Congress, by accepting the
family responsibility justification for the joint return provision, was placed
in the position of having to adjust other taxpayers' tax liability accord-
ingly. The creation of the head of household classification was a tacit
recognition by Congress that married taxpayers were now the basic tax
74. To achieve tax equity, the split income plan required a tax based on a system that
disregarded, as between husband and wife, the legal ownership of income-producing prop-
erty. Consequently, the married couple had to be viewed as a unit. See Surrey, supra note
73, at 1114.
Nevertheless, a Congressional report, containing a section entitled "Equalization of Tax
Burdens of Residents of Community Property and Common-Law States", dealt only with
the need for geographic equalization and ignored the decision to make the married couple
the basic tax unit. H.R. REP. No. 1274, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 47-49 (1948).
75. A Treasury Department report and testimony before the House Ways and Means
Committee both warned that income splitting was not a complete solution to the inequity
problem since it left single taxpayers with an unjustifiably high tax burden. See U.S. DEPr.
OF TREASURY, THE TAX TREATMENT OF FAMILY INCOME, reprinted in Hearings on Commu-
nity Property and Family Partnerships Before the House Ways and Means Comm., 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 846, 852-66 (1947); Hearings on Community Property and Family Partnerships
Before the House Ways and Means Comm., 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 898 (1947) (testimony of
Murray Flack). The congressional committee reports, however, did not mention this short-
coming of the income splitting proposal. S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in
[1948] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1163; H.R. REP. No. 1274, 80th Cong., 2d Sess.
reprinted in [1948] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1258. See Note, supra note 6 at nn.50-53
and accompanying text.
76. See authorities cited note 75, supra.
77. See Bittker,.supra note 12, at 1416-17.
78. Revenue Act of 1951, ch. 521, § 301, 65 Stat. 480 (1951) (now I.R.C. § I(b)).
79. Id
[Vol. 28:87
Federal Taxation and Marriage
unit for federal taxation. A second adjustment was made in 1954 with the
adoption of the surviving spouse provision, which enabled a surviving
spouse to use the joint return provision for two years after the death of his
or her spouse, given the requisite family responsibility. 80
The extra tax burden on single taxpayers quickly earned the battle cry of
a "singles penalty." The single taxpayers pressed their claims of tax dis-
crimination with little success, 8 ' however, until Congress reexamined the
single tax rate schedule and enacted the Tax Reform Act of 1969. This
Act created the present four tax rate schedules. 82 The change was effectu-
ated by reducing the single taxpayers' schedule and making a new "mar-
ried filing separate returns" rate schedule from the previous singles' tax
rate schedule.8
3
In deciding to reduce the single taxpayers' rate schedule, Congress con-
cluded that the tax burden on single taxpayers was too great. Instead of
reexamining the justifications of the joint return provision, however, Con-
gress merely provided single taxpayers with a rate reduction. By so doing,
it apparently accepted the family responsibility and additional expense
justifications for the tax break given married taxpayers. 84 Because of its
failure to reexamine these justifications, however, the single taxpayers' rate
reduction did not end the singles penalty, but in fact created a new mar-
riage penalty. Thus for dual income married couples, when the incomes
approach equal amounts, the rate of tax on each income is higher than if
the couple had chosen not to marry.
85
80. I.R.C. § 2(a). A surviving spouse is defined as a widow or widower whose spouse
died within one of the two previous taxable years and whose home is the principal place of
abode for a dependent child. Id
81. Perhaps this was due to the decrease in the number of single taxpayers. The per-
centage of single individuals declined from 22.8% of the population over the age of 14 in
1950 to 16.3% of the population over the age of 18 in 1970. If divorced and widowed indi-
viduals are included in the percentages, the percentage of single taxpayers declined from
33.0% of the population in 1950 to 28.4% in 1970. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, at Table 48 (1977).
82. See I.R.C. § 1(c). Under the new rate schedule, tax liability for single persons is
never more than 20% in excess of that paid on a joint return with the same taxable income.
The 20% excess contrasts with 42% excess under prior law. The Act also provided a new
head of household rate schedule halfway between the schedule for joint returns and the new
schedule for single persons. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 26, at 8.
83. The current singles tax rate schedule is halfway between the current married filing
separate and married filing jointly rate schedules. See I.R.C. § 1.
84. The Senate noted that although some difference between tax rates of single and
married persons is justified to reflect the extra expenses of married taxpayers, the existing
differential of 42% could not be justified on this basis. S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
262, reprinted in [1969] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2027, 2030-31.
85. See Rothblum, supra note 9, at 5. The 1969 granting of partial income splitting to
single persons through the reduced rate schedule, without granting comparable benefits to
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Prior to the 1969 reform, married persons filing separately could use the
single persons' rate schedule. The 1969 reform, however, restricted these
taxpayers to the old singles' rate schedule which is generally disadvanta-
geous in comparison to the joint return schedule.86 Consequently, dual
income married couples with comparable earnings could not escape the
marriage penalty. This created the third stage in the role of marital status
in federal taxation. No longer was marriage solely a tax break, but now
could be a substantial tax penalty. Nevertheless, the basic tax unit re-
mained the married couple, since all married taxpayers with the same in-
come still had the same tax liability.
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 was enacted without any discussion of the
marriage penalty it created. Instead, the discussion of the new rate sched-
ule was centered around providing tax relief to single taxpayers.87 Al-
though a solution to both the singles penalty and the marriage penalty
would be a return to the individual as the basic tax unit,88 unfortunately
the two taxpayer groups affected by the discrimination cannot agree on a
common solution. At the present time, each group is pushing for a quick
solution to reduce its own tax liability and has little concern for the result-
ing tax consequences to other taxpayers.8 9 To single taxpayers, the "mar-
ried filing jointly" tax rate schedule is the quick solution; while to dual
income married taxpayers, the single tax rate schedule is the answer.
Because of the increasing number of dual income married taxpayers and
the publicity about tax motivated divorces,90 the marriage penalty is being
discussed more frequently. Various proposals have been mentioned as
possible solutions to tax discrimination claims of dual income married and
single taxpayers. No concrete proposal to deal with the marriage penalty
issue, however, is being seriously discussed by Congress.9' Nor has Con-
gress shown any willingness to discuss realistically the issue of the proper
married persons who file separate returns, is primarily responsible for the marriage penalty
phenomenon. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 26, at 13.
86. See Bittker, supra note 12, at 1429-30. The effect was a mandatory joint return.
Id at 1429.
87. See Note, supra note 6, at 678. But see Bittker, supra note 12, at 1431. Bittker
views the price of the 1969 reform as either a penalty on some married couples or abandon-
ment of the 1948 principle of imposing equal taxes on equal income couples. Certainly
Congress never intended to create the marriage penalty when it attempted to alleviate the
tax burden of the single taxpayer. See also Comment, Federal Income Tax Discrimination
Between Married and Single Taxpayers, 7 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 667, 690 (1974).
88. See notes 109 and 141 and accompanying text infra.
89. See Rothblum, supra note 9, at 3.
90. See note 47 supra.
91. See Key, Let's Stop the Tax on Marriage, The Wash. Post, Jan. 29, 1978, at C8, col.
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tax unit and the role of marital status in federal taxation. Thus, no major
change can be expected in the immediate future.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Most of the solutions offered to cure tax discrimination solve the singles
penalty by ignoring the marriage penalty or vice versa. This occurs for
two basic reasons: the proposed solution usually reflects the self-interest of
its proponent and the proposed solution will likely increase some taxpay-
ers' taxes if both claims are solved simultaneously. The proposed solu-
tions which will be discussed show the difficulty of achieving a workable
solution that meets the principles of neutrality, horizontal equity and
progressivity.
A. Federal Definition of Income
Several commentators have suggested that a federal definition of income
would eliminate certain inequities.92 Such a proposal would overrule the
Poe decision,93 which concluded that the federal tax system was depen-
dent on state law for its definition of income because no independent fed-
eral definition had been enacted. There appears to be no constitutional
prohibition to disregarding state property law, since the sixteenth amend-
ment provided Congress with the plenary authority to levy an income tax
and Congress has expressly disregarded community property law in sev-
eral Code provisions.
94
By adopting a federal definition of income, the original reason for enact-
ment of the joint return provision in 1948-geographical tax eq-
uity-would be eliminated. State law would no longer determine to
whom investment income is to be taxed, and hence income splitting would
be unnecessary to achieve geographical tax equity. A decision to continue
the joint return provision would have to be made on the value of the provi-
sion in other respects. This proposed solution does not by itself provide a
solution to the tax discrimination claims, since it does not address inequi-
ties based on marital status. Unless a decision to return to the pre-1948
single rate schedule structure or to continue to use the income splitting
benefits of the joint return provision accompanies enactment of federal
definition, this solution will only produce uniformity of application with
92. See, e.g., TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM, supra note 8, at 488-89 (material submitted
by Eugene J. Brenner); Sjostrand, supra note 13, at 423.
93. 282 U.S. 101, 117 (1930). See notes 63-67 and accompanying text supra.
94. Examples of provisions which are applied without regard to community property
laws are best shown in the pension area. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 402(e)(4)(a)(G).
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little effect on the present tax structure.95
B. Full Assignment of Income
Under this theory, a taxpayer could shift income in order to lower tax
liability. 96 An adoption of a provision to allow the valid legal assignment
of income, whether investment or earned income, for tax purposes would
expand the Lucas decision which effectively allowed taxpayers to transfer
investment income.97 Under Lucas, earned income could not be assigned
until the wage earner had the rights to it.98 There appears to be no legal
prohibition to assigning earned income, provided that state law recognizes
an irrevocable transfer of the right to the income prior to its payment to
the wage earner.99
An adoption of this proposed solution would open the door for all types
of artificial income shifting devices.1°° Earned income which is majority
of income for most taxpayers could be shifted from the wage earner to a
spouse or child possessing a substantially lower marginal tax rate in order
to pay a lower combined tax. Although there is no reason that the poten-
tial for shifting income from investments and personal services should be
different, the ease with which legal title to investments can be transferred
nonetheless makes it more likely that this type of shifting will occur. Al-
lowing the full assignment of all income, however, would violate the prin-
ciple of progressivity, since the progressive tax rate could be circumvented
by assignment of both types of income to lower marginal tax rate individu-
als. For this reason, this proposal, like the federal definition of income
proposal, does not by itself provide a solution to the tax discrimination
claims. Because it would create severe revenue problems, any serious con-
95. Both Brenner and Sjostrand discuss the elimination of income splitting and the re-
quirement that each spouse in a community property state report, on an individual return,
income earned by the taxpayer or produced by property subject to his control. See TAX
REVISION COMPENDIUM supra note 8, at 488-89 (material submitted by Eugene J. Brenner);
Sjostrand, supra note 13, at 423. Sjostrand appears to embrace the idea while Brenner
wisely notes that it is not politically feasible. Brenner also notes that it would possibly upset
the system of property law in community property states, and that it further discriminates
against earned income in favor of investment income which can be shifted more easily.
96. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 26, at 17; Rothblum, Tax Eq-
ulty Between the Married and Single [sic]: Solutions Causes [sic] Problems, 4 TAx NOTES 13
(1976).
97. 281 U.S. 111 (1930). See notes 60-62 and accompanying text supra.
98. 281 U.S. at 114-15. An exception to this general principle is Poe Y. Seaborn, 282
U.S. 101 (1930). Since federal law was held to be dependent on state law to define owner-
ship of property, however, the result was distinguished from a voluntary assignment which
arose out of agreements between the parties involved.
99. See, e.g., Leschner v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 1003 (1962).
100. See note 58 supra.
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sideration of full assignment of income is unlikely.' 0 '
C. Mandatory Joint Return
This proposed solution was first seriously considered in 1941.102 As
with a federal definition of income, a mandatory joint return would curtail
the advantage of married taxpayers in community property states because
a married couple would be required to aggregate their income irrespective
of whether the couple had single or dual incomes. Because the marginal
rates of the present "married filing jointly" and "married filing separately"
schedules almost compel married taxpayers to file jointly, 10 3 this proposal
would only change the present tax system if the joint rate schedules were
concomitantly altered.
If a single tax rate schedule were adopted, this proposal would continue
the "marriage penalty" for dual income married taxpayers. 104 If two tax
rate schedules were adopted with rate brackets for the married taxpay-
ers, '05 twice as wide as those for single taxpayers, the singles penalty would
be maintained. 106 This tax structure would basically resemble the one en-
acted by the Revenue Act of 1948. Other variations in the tax rate sched-
101. Income splitting by spouses who file joint returns is currently allowed. See I.R.C. §
1(a). Extension of such splitting to other individuals would likely result in massive shifting
of income to individuals with the lowest marginal tax rates. As a consequence, tax revenue
would fall substantially, resulting in an increased federal budget deficit.
102. In 1941, the Treasury Department finally convinced the House Ways and Means
Committee to recommend mandatory joint returns. H.R. REP. No. 1040, 77th Cong., 1st
Sess. 17-22 (1941). See Bittker, supra note 12, at 1408. The 1941 proposal would have
increased the tax liability of all married couples living in community property states and of
all dual income couples living in common law states. Due to heavy protests from these
groups, the proposal was deleted from the final bill. Revenue Act of 1941, ch. 412, § 101, 55
Stat. 687 (1941) (current version at I.R.C. § 1). See Bittker, supra note 12, at 1408-11.
103. For a comparison of the "married filing jointly" and the "married filing separately"
tax schedules, see Table 1, supra note 14. See generally Bittker, supra note 12, at 1429.
104. Since there would be but one rate schedule, income splitting would in effect be
eliminated, and the second spouse's income would be taxed as additional income to the first
spouse at a higher marginal tax rate.
105. Rate brackets determine the marginal tax rate of a taxpayer. A taxpayer's rate
bracket is determined by his or her income being within a specified income range. The tax
brackets for "married filing joint" returns are twice as wide as the "married filing separate"
returns. For example, on the joint return schedule, the marginal tax rate for the rate bracket
of $11,200 to $15,200 is 22%, while on the separate return schedule, the marginal rate of 22%
is on the rate bracket of $5,600 to $7,600, or one-half the joint return schedule rate bracket.
I.R.C. § l(a), (d). The rate brackets were changed by the Revenue Act of 1978 for tax years
beginning after December 31, 1978. Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 101(a) (Nov. 6, 1978). See note
36 supra.
106. This structure would retain the benefits of income splitting for married couples. At
its highest level, when the incomes of a dual income married couple are equal, the marginal
tax rate for the couple would only be equal to that of a single taxpayer.
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ules would only repeat the changes made in the present tax rate schedules
since 1948.
Another potential variation is a two tax rate structure which would rec-
ognize only the expenses incurred by married taxpayers in excess of those
incurred by single taxpayers. In essence, this two rate structure would
recognize the additional expenses of married taxpayers only through the
subsistence level.107 Once the income level of married taxpayers exceeded
the subsistence level, the two tax rate schedules would merge into one.
But, while the singles penalty would be reduced as the two rate schedules
merged, the marriage penalty for dual income married taxpayers would
increase. The dual income married taxpayers would still be required to
aggregate their income and pay taxes at a higher marginal tax rate. Thus,
without some form of relief for the marriage penalty, the large number of
dual income married taxpayers in the voting public should prevent the
enactment of this proposed solution.
D. Dual Tax Rate Structure
Invoking a dual tax rate structure'0 8 would provide the income splitting
advantage to single taxpayers and remove the singles penalty. There are
two alternatives under this proposed solution. The first is to create two
separate rate schedules, one for single taxpayers and one for married
taxpayers filing separately. 109 The second is to create one rate schedule
and require each taxpayer to file his or her own return.m 0
Under the first alternative, the rate brackets for the married person
schedule would be half as wide as the rate brackets for the single tax rate
schedule. 11 Consequently, the marginal tax rate for singles would equal
that for married taxpayers with the same income, and the singles penalty
107. See notes 31-32 and accompanying text, supra.
108. Dual tax rate schedule is defined to mean a single rate of taxation for use by both
single and married taxpayers (i.e. dual use).
109. See Harmelink and Krause, Disparate Tax Treatment- The Case of Singles, 51
TAXES 494, 497 (1973). Harmelink and Krause propose one rate schedule for all married
taxpayers. The married couples' schedule would be one-half as wide as for each married
person. Accordingly, the tax liability of singles and married couples would be identical.
110. See Sjostrand, supra note 13, at 423-24. Sjostrand identifies three problems that
must be dealt with even if a single rate schedule can be agreed upon. The first involves the
marriage penalty and is solved by the filing of individual returns. The second involves the
advantage that community property state residents would have over common law state resi-
dents. See notes 63-69 and accompanying text supra. A final problem results from the
opportunity to split income which would be available through either the joint ownership or
the transfer of ownership of income-producing property.
Many states have a combined return which allows both spouses to file separate returns but
on the same tax return. Maryland, the District of Columbia and Virginia use such a return.
111. These schedules would have the same relationship as the current schedule for "mar-
ried filing joint" return and "married filing separate" return. See I.R.C. §§ I(a), (d).
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would be eliminated. In order to make this alternative acceptable to mar-
ried taxpayers, the income splitting benefit of the joint return provision
must be continued. Each spouse must be considered to have earned half
of the income of the married taxpayer unit. If income splitting were not
permitted and the actual income of each spouse were applied to the mar-
ried tax rate schedule, the marriage penalty would be greatest for the sin-
gle income couple because income splitting would not lower the marginal
tax rate.
By treating each spouse as an individual for the tax rate schedule, this
proposal looks to the individual as the basic tax unit. Nonetheless, it still
allows an individual to lower his or her tax liability by marriage since
income splitting must be used to achieve equality between the single tax-
payer and the married taxpayer when both earn the same income. If in-
come splitting were not permitted, the marriage penalty would not be
cured by this alternative. A failure to permit income splitting would effec-
tively recognize two tax units: the single taxpayer and the married couple.
Consequently, equality between each individual taxpayer could not be
achieved. Dual income married taxpayers with aggregated income would
be taxed at a higher marginal tax rate than would two single taxpayers
with the equal combined income.
Under the second alternative, a single rate schedule with each taxpayer
responsible for his or her return, tax equality could be achieved and the
marriage penalty eliminated. With a single rate structure each taxpayer
would be taxed on his or her income. This alternative would define the
individual as the basic tax unit and remove marital status as a factor in
federal taxation. In essence, this proposal would effectively reinstate the
1948 tax structure without its joint return provision.'12
Prior to 1948, however, the single rate structure spawned income shifting
schemes in order to equalize the income of each spouse and achieve the
lowest combined tax liability. The dual rate schedules in the first alterna-
tive eliminate the need for income shifting schemes, since income is auto-
matically split between the spouses. Thus this alternative recognizes the
married couple as a unit with each spouse sharing equally in the benefits
and burdens of the marriage. Moreover, it justifies income splitting be-
cause each spouse is responsible for the success of the marital unit. The
second alternative eliminates the marriage penalty, but makes income
112. See generally, notes 72-77 and accompanying text supra.
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shifting devices relevant in determining a taxpayer's tax liability. The sin-
gle rate schedule also eliminates the tax equality between single income
married and dual income married taxpayers, since only the individual
would be recognized as a tax unit.
The single rate schedule, nevertheless, also offers a viable solution to the
issue of the role of marriage in federal taxation. Although the two rate
schedule acknowledges marriage as a joint venture with each spouse shar-
ing the income equally by continuing the use of the income splitting bene-
fit, it also continues the marriage penalty. In comparison, a single rate
schedule that eliminates the use of income shifting devices would treat all
taxpayers alike, and it would not use a second tax unit in the structure.
Such a result would, however, make equality between tax units a virtual
impossibility.
E. Earned Income Allowance
An earned income allowance has been suggested to reduce the addi-
tional expenses incurred by dual income married taxpayers when both
spouses earn income.113 Probably the broadest version of this approach
has been suggested by Professor Bittker. The Bittker proposal would pro-
vide a deduction for all expenses attributable to the fact that both spouses,
rather than only one, are working, including expenses caused by the secon-
dary wage earner's loss of time and energy for household services. 1 4 By
granting a credit or deduction against the tax liability of dual income mar-
ried taxpayers, the marriage penalty would be reduced. Although the
marriage penalty exists for all dual income married taxpayers, whether the
second income is earned from personal services or investments, current
proposals have suggested only that the additional earned income expenses
be recognized as a legitimate tax deduction."15 The reasons for this are
twofold: first, most investment expenses are already deductible" 6 and sec-
ond, the belief that a tax break should be provided only to those married
couples who must work for a living to make ends meet. The idea of an
additional tax benefit for those taxpayers who rely on passive investments
113. See Bittker, supra note 12, at 1433-37; Rothblum, supra note 96, at 14-15.
114. See Bittker, supra note 12, at 1433.
115. Id The child care deduction, recently repealed, was designed to increase the pre-tax
net income of working parents. I.R.C. § 214 (repealed by Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-455, § 504(b)(1), 90 Stat. 1565 (1976)). The Tax Reform Act of 1976 replaced the
deduction-with a child care tax credit in I.R.C. § 44A. Bittker criticized this provision be-
cause it was difficult to determine "whether a taxpayer hired a babysitter in order to work,
worked in order to hire a babysitter, or would have hired a babysitter anyway." Bittker,
supra note 12, at 1434.
116. I.R.C. § 212. This includes "traveling expenses (including amounts expended for
meals and lodging... ) while away from home." I.R.C. § 162(a)(2).
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for their income does not earn sufficient sympathy from taxpayers to make
it a viable option.
As a result, this proposal accepts the rationale that the additional ex-
penses of married taxpayers warrant the tax benefit of the joint return pro-
vision. 117 Moreover it seeks to extend the argument to cover not only
increased living expenses, but also increased working expenses. The pro-
posal, however, neither ends the marriage penalty nor addresses the singles
penalty. To provide a deduction or credit for commuting and clothing
expenses, as well as for additional household and other expenses of the
second spouse-merely because both spouses work--creates a tax benefit
for dual income married taxpayers. Such taxpayers would be granted a
deduction for personal expenses, a deduction which would be provided
neither to single taxpayers nor to single income married taxpayers. All
taxpayers who work for their income, however, incur the same expenses
for which only the second spouse of a dual income married couple would
receive a tax benefit.
118
Most of these earned income allowance proposals have set arbitrary per-
centages of gross earned income as a deduction or a credit without any
attempt to tie the percentage to the actual additional expenses incurred
because of a second job. 1 9 The proposals have also set up a phase-out
point as the income level of the second spouse (ie., the lower paid wage
earner) rises to a predetermined income level.120 In theory this income
limitation is necessary to prevent abuse of the tax benefit.121 In spite of
these considerations, however, the limitations of the earned income allow-
ance clearly define it as a stopgap measure aimed at providing tax relief
from the marriage penalty to a specific class of taxpayers. Nonetheless,
the justification behind the proposal is equally applicable to all taxpayers.
Each taxpayer incurs additional expenses by working which, unlike the
expenses incurred in making investments, are not deductible. The propos-
als do indicate the need to recognize the costs of earning a living which
117. See notes 26-32 and accompanying text supra. But see Rothblum, supra note 96, at
14-15. Rothblum argues that the proposal deals with a problem caused by employment, not
marriage, and consequently could be extended to all working taxpayers. This might make
the proposal so costly, however, that it would no longer be feasible. Id
118. Everyone who works away from home must get to the job site, have appropriate
clothing, and pay for lunch if it is inconvenient to bring it. Everyone who works, not just
the secondary wage earner of a married couple, has less time and energy to keep house.
Bittker, supra note 12, at 1435.
119. Peckman, for example, has suggested either a deduction of 25% or a credit of 10% of
the second salary. Hearings on the Economic Problems of Women Before the Joint Economic
Committee, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 254 (1973) (statement of Joseph Peckman).
120. See Sjostrand, supra note 13, at 424-26.
121. Id at 423-24.
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reduce the income available for consumption by the taxpayer. A compre-
hensive solution involving a job expense deduction to all taxpayers, or at
least to low income taxpayers, however, is preferable to limiting the tax
benefit to a single class of taxpayers.
F Elective Filing Status
The elective filing status proposal consists of two alternatives. The first
allows married taxpayers to file as single taxpayers when advantageous to
do so.' 22 The second alternative permits all taxpayers to use whichever
tax rate schedule produces the lowest tax liability.
123
The first alternative addresses only the marriage penalty issue. It ends
this penalty for all dual income married taxpayers since they could take
advantage of the lower single tax rate schedule. Yet inequality between
married taxpayers earning the same total income would be created, be-
cause single income couples would have to use the joint return schedule
while dual income couples with the same income could use the single per-
sons' schedule. I24 Under the present tax structure, the marriage penalty is
the greatest when the income of both spouses is nearly equal.125 This pro-
posal reverses this effect and allows for the greatest tax savings when the
income of both spouses is nearly equal. Consequently, it would reestab-
lish the tax benefit for residents of community property states since com-
munity property states automatically split income between spouses.'
26
This proposal would also make income shifting schemes within the mar-
riage advantageous. 2 7 Nevertheless, no solution is offered to the singles
penalty by this alternative and because married taxpayers would lower
122. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 26, at 16-17; Bittker, supra
note 12, at 1437-42; Richards, Single Y. Married Income Tax Returns Under the Tax Reform
Act of 1969, 48 TAXES 301, 304 (1970). This would eliminate the need for a married filing
separately tax schedule since this schedule imposes the highest tax liability and would not be
used. Single income married taxpayers would use the married filing joint return tax sched-
ule, while dual income married taxpayers would use this schedule until their incomes ap-
proached equality. As the marriage penalty began to take effect, dual income married
taxpayers would file as single taxpayers. Married taxpayers desiring to file separately would
always use the single taxpayer rate schedule.
123. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 26, at 16-17.
124. See Bittker, supra note 12, at 1438-39. See also Sjostrand supra note 13, at 423-24.
Dual income married taxpayers would each file a separate return on the income which they
earned individually. In contrast, the single income married taxpayer would file only one
return and would use the married filing jointly rate schedule, since that schedule would
impose the lowest tax liability.
125. See notes 36-39 and accompanying text supra.
126. See text accompanying notes 62-67 supra.
127. When dual income married taxpayers found their incomes approaching equality,
they would file separate returns using the single taxpayers' rate schedule. The average mar-
ginal tax rate on these returns could be minimized by equalizing the reported income on the
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their tax liabilities substantially by shifting income, single taxpayers would
once again bear the heavier tax burden.
In contrast, by allowing the use of any tax rate schedule, the second
alternative would eliminate the singles penalty, but would not end the
marriage penalty. This alternative would effectively combine the present
four tax rate schedules into two. All taxpayers, except dual income mar-
ried taxpayers, would use the "married filing jointly" tax rate schedule
since it provides the lowest rate. Dual income married taxpayers, how-
ever, would use the single tax rate schedule whenever both incomes be-
come substantially equal.' 28 This proposal would create a large revenue
lOSS, 129 without solving the marriage penalty.
Neither alternative addresses the dilemma underlying the discrimination
claims. Both the alternatives solve one discrimination claim without solv-
ing the other. Moreover the proposal ignores the fundamental need to
decide what the tax unit and the tax rate structure should be.
G. Split Tax Return
This proposed solution would provide a tax advantage to earned income
as long as the taxpayer has only earned income and would eliminate both
the singles and the marriage penalty. 130 A marriage penalty would still
exist, however, when the second income source for the married taxpayer
was primarily investment income.13' The proposal would establish a sin-
gle tax rate schedule and require a mandatory joint return for all married
taxpayers. 132 The split tax return determines the tax on the earned in-
come of each taxpayer and the tax on the aggregate investment income of
the tax unit, whether the unit is the married couple or the household
returns as nearly as possible. The advantage of income shifting devices lies in their ability
to do this.
128. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 26, at 7.
129. As a result of this alternative, taxpayers in all categories would be using a lower rate
schedule.
130. Cf. TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM, supra note 8, at 488 (material submitted by Eu-
gene J. Brenner, examining alternatives to income splitting).
131. Net investment tax is determined by separately calculating the tax on a married
couple's earned income and their aggregated investment and earned income. The earned
income tax is then subtracted from the aggregate tax to find net investment tax. Since there
is but a single rate schedule, and the earned income of both spouses is used in computing net
investment tax, the tax on investment income for a dual income married couple will be at a
higher marginal tax rate for a single taxpayer or a single income married couple.
132. Cf. TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM, supra note 8, at 488-489 (material submitted by
Eugene J. Brenner, discussing the political nonfeasibility of compulsory joint returns and a
one tax rate structure).
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unit. 133 For the single taxpayer and the single income married taxpayer,
the structure would operate as it did prior to 1948. The total incomes of
the single taxpayer and the single income married taxpayer would be used
to determine their tax liabilities. The complication arises when both
spouses receive earned income in a dual income married taxpayer unit. In
this situation, determining their tax liability would require five steps:
(1) Determine the tax on the aggregate investment and earned
income of the married couple.
(2) Determine the tax on the aggregate earned income of the
married couple.
(3) Subtract the tax in (2) from the tax in (1) to find the net
investment tax.
(4) Determine separately the tax on the earned income of each
spouse.
(5) Finally, add the net investment tax in (3) to the two earned
income taxes in (4) to find the tax liability of the married
couple.
If the entire income of the dual income married taxpayer family were
earned income, only steps (4) and (5) would be required to find its tax
liability. This proposal would result in the dual income married unit pay-
ing two single taxes as was proposed in the first alternative of the elective
filing status proposal. 34 The split tax return proposal, however, still pe-
nalizes dual income married taxpayers when most of their income is in-
vestment income. A justification for this distinction is that tax relief
should be given only to those who must work for a living and not to those
who rely on passive activities to produce their income.1 35 A further justifi-
cation for the aggregation of investment income in this proposal is that the
ownership of the investment can be easily transferred to achieve an income
splitting result.
This proposal removes marital status as a factor in taxation of earned
income while recognizing the married couple as a legitimate tax unit with
regard to investment income. Married taxpayers generally hold their in-
vestments for a common goal and should be taxed on them as a unit re-
gardless of the technical ownership of the income. This proposal would
also require a federal definition of income to keep the community property
133. For a thorough discussion of the current tax unit, its history and a number of alter-
native structures, see Thorson, supra note 7, at 114-32.
134. See text accompanying note 121 supra.
135. Cf. Blumberg, supra note 13, at 60-61, in which the author suggests that the costs of
earning income should be excluded from taxable income. Under this suggestion taxpayers
who earn their income from their labors would gain a tax benefit not available to taxpayers
who receive their income from passive investments.
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states from having an unfair advantage over other jurisdictions. 136 The
split tax return is not likely to be given serious consideration, however,
because of its harsh treatment of investment income. Given the political
clout of those who rely on investments for part of their income, it is unreal-
istic to expect a serious discussion of this proposal. Moreover, the compli-
cated formula required to be invoked when there is investment income
also renders enactment of this proposal unlikely.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE
A workable solution results from the combination of various parts of the
solutions discussed above. This alternative includes four parts: (1) a fed-
eral definition of income,137 (2) a single tax rate schedule, 38 (3) the use of
the individual as the basic tax unit, 39 and (4) a reduced tax rate. Enact-
ment of all four parts is necessary to permanently solve the problem of tax
discrimination on the basis of marital status. A piecemeal approach
would be unsatisfactory.
Part one of this alternative, the adoption of a federal definition of in-
come, provides the uniformity in the tax law which cannot exist so long as
states can define income. 14° The uniformity produced by this step rein-
forces two of the basic principles in taxation. First, geographical neutral-
ity is achieved because the residence of a taxpayer will not alter the tax he
has to pay. Secondly, equity is achieved by treating each taxpayer in the
same manner in similar transactions. This simple change would also re-
move the need for the joint return provisions added in 1948 to offset the
advantage of the community property law states. The removal of this
main obstacle between equal treatment of taxpayers in different states fa-
cilitates the enactment of a total solution to the problem of tax discrimina-
tion. The remaining steps then have a uniform base upon which to be
built.
The second and third steps, the single tax rate schedule and the use of
the individual as the basic tax unit, should be viewed as a package, be-
cause the adoption of one without the other is virtually meaningless. To
adopt a single tax rate schedule, while allowing both married taxpayers
and single taxpayers, as different tax units, to use it merely reduces the
136. See notes 62-67, 92-95, and accompanying text supra.
137. See notes 92-95 and accompanying text supra.
138. See the split tax return, note 131 and accompanying text supra; the second alterna-
tive of the dual tax rate structure proposal, note 110 and accompanying text supra; and
discussion of the mandatory joint return, note 99 and accompanying text supra.
139. See note 132 supra.
140. The distinction between community property and common law states is relevant
here. See text accompanying notes 63-67 supra.
19781
Catholic University Law Review
present four tax rate schedule structure to a two schedule structure. 141
Likewise, to adopt the individual as the tax unit and still have different tax
rate schedules for taxpayers based on marital status is merely ceremonial
change from the present tax structure. The simultaneous enactment of
these two steps, however, would be a positive step towards removing mari-
tal status as a major factor in federal taxation. They would remove the
present structure's built-in-bias towards the single income married tax-
payer by applying the same rate structure to income earners, whether mar-
ried or single. Adopting a single rate structure also adheres to the princi-
ple of progressivity since individual taxpayers with the same taxable
income would be taxed in the same rate bracket regardless of their marital
status.
The impact of marital status cannot be completely eliminated from the
federal tax system, however. But this alternative can confine it to a role
similar to the dependency exemption granted for children on a tax re-
turn. 42 An adjustment to the taxable income of a taxpayer would be al-
lowed, but marriage would no longer provide a different rate structure, use
of which is limited to certain taxpayers. Single income married taxpayers
and dual income married taxpayers would not be taxed equally because
the individual would be the unit from which tax equality would be mea-
sured. 143 By necessity equality cannot exist for both groups, as long as
two different tax units are used as the judging criteria.
Reducing the tax rate, the final step of this proposal, would not necessar-
ily curb the tax discrimination on account of marital status. Rather, its
purpose is to ensure passage of the whole proposal. In adopting a single
tax rate structure, the tax liabilities of individual taxpayers would change.
The tax burden of the married taxpayer relative to that of the single tax-
payer would be increased. If a lower tax rate were adopted which reduces
the ultimate tax liability of a married taxpayer, the structural change
would be more palatable to all taxpayers.
Only this total approach would provide a workable solution to the issue
of the rate of marital status in taxation. In order to be politically success-
ful, a proposal must consider the immediate practical effects of its compo-
nents. Most importantly, however, in order to be successful over the long-
run, such a proposal must address the whole issue of the proper tax unit
141. This is the same result that would follow if taxpayers were to have the use of any
current schedule, which is the second alternative of the elective filing status proposal. See
note 128 and accompanying text supra.
142. I.R.C. §§ 151, 152.
143. Bittker correctly states, "we cannot simultaneously have (a) progression, (b) equal
taxes on equal-income married couples [horizontal equity], and (c) a marriage neutral tax
burden." Bittker, supra note 12, at 1396.
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and the appropriate role of marriage in federal income taxation. Until
these questions are faced squarely, the tax structure will remain funda-
mentally unfair.

